The Ontology for Biomedical Investigations (OBI) is an ontology that provides terms with precisely defined meanings to describe all aspects of how investigations in the biological and medical domains are conducted. OBI re-uses ontologies that provide a representation of biomedical knowledge from the Open Biological and Biomedical Ontologies (OBO) project and adds the ability to describe how this knowledge was derived. We here describe the state of OBI and several applications that are using it, such as adding semantic expressivity to (...) existing databases, building data entry forms, and enabling interoperability between knowledge resources. OBI covers all phases of the investigation process, such as planning, execution and reporting. It represents information and material entities that participate in these processes, as well as roles and functions. Prior to OBI, it was not possible to use a single internally consistent resource that could be applied to multiple types of experiments for these applications. OBI has made this possible by creating terms for entities involved in biological and medical investigations and by importing parts of other biomedical ontologies such as GO, Chemical Entities of Biological Interest (ChEBI) and Phenotype Attribute and Trait Ontology (PATO) without altering their meaning. OBI is being used in a wide range of projects covering genomics, multi-omics, immunology, and catalogs of services. OBI has also spawned other ontologies (Information Artifact Ontology) and methods for importing parts of ontologies (Minimum information to reference an external ontology term (MIREOT)). The OBI project is an open cross-disciplinary collaborative effort, encompassing multiple research communities from around the globe. To date, OBI has created 2366 classes and 40 relations along with textual and formal definitions. The OBI Consortium maintains a web resource providing details on the people, policies, and issues being addressed in association with OBI. (shrink)

The decision to initiate invasive, first-in-human trials involving Parkinson’s disease presents a vexing ethical challenge. Such studies present significant surgical risks, and high degrees of uncertainty about intervention risks and biological effects. We argue that maintaining a favorable riskbenefit balance in such circumstances requires a higher than usual degree of confidence that protocols will lead to significant direct and/or social benefits. One critical way of promoting such confidence is through the application of stringent evidentiary standards for preclinical studies. We close (...) with a series of recommendations for strengthening the internal and external validity of preclinical studies, reducing their tendency toward optimism and publication biases, and improving the knowledge base used to design and evaluate preclinical studies. (shrink)

The text- and argument-focused histories of philosophy that we have are mainly interested in teasing out the details of the positions taken on philosophical issues by individual philosophers. But this is a long way from having a historical explanation of the larger-scale trajectory of philosophical development. An empirical history of philosophy, however, examines the institutionalized places and venues for philosophical work that provide a rich, shared structure for the promotion of particular sorts of work. Mid-twentieth-century philosophers of science such as (...) Herbert Feigl and Philipp Frank knew what they were doing—they were creating the space to promote certain sorts of work in venues such as the Institute for the Unity of Science and the Minnesota Center for Philosophy of Science and, ultimately, in publication venues such as Daedalus and the Minnesota Studies in Philosophy of Science. Here the engine of progress is the institution-building activity of committed philosophers making a space within the institutional structures of philosophy for their own projects and other projects aligned with them and transmitting these as live philosophical projects to the next generation. (shrink)

In my paper “On the Probabilities of Conditionals,” I claimed, mistakenly, that David Lewis’s four triviality results and Alan Hájek’s proof depend on the application of the following principle to conditionals containing nested conditionals.

In my paper “On the Probabilities of Conditionals,” I claimed, mistakenly, that David Lewis’s four triviality results and Alan Hájek’s proof depend on the application of the following principle to conditionals containing nested conditionals.

In my paper “On the Probabilities of Conditionals,” I claimed, mistakenly, that David Lewis’s four triviality results and Alan Hájek’s proof depend on the application of the following principle to conditionals containing nested conditionals.

Any system of taxation depends on a substantial degree of compliance from the taxpayer. But do ethical considerations stop at obeying the letter of the tax law, or do they drive one to take a more critical and socially responsible attitude towards tax avoidance as well as evasion? Dr Alan Stainer is Head of Engineering Management at Middlesex University, Bounds Green Road, London N11 2NQ, and Founder Director of the International Society for Productivity & Quality Research; Lorice Stainer is (...) Senior Lecturer in Business Ethics at the University of Hertfordshire Business School and a Business Ethics Consultant; and Alexandra Segal is a Chartered Accountant, Taxation Manager with Keelings Chartered Accountants, London, and a Taxation Consultant. (shrink)

Frank Ramsey (1931) wrote: If two people are arguing 'if p will q?' and both are in doubt as to p, they are adding p hypothetically to their stock of knowledge and arguing on that basis about q. We can say that they are fixing their degrees of belief in q given p. Let us take the first sentence the way it is often taken, as proposing the following test for the acceptability of an indicative conditional: ‘If p then (...) q’ is acceptable to a subject S iff, were S to accept p and consider q, S would accept q. Now consider an indicative conditional of the form (1) If p, then I believe p. Suppose that you accept p and consider ‘I believe p’. To accept p while rejecting ‘I believe p’ is tantamount to accepting the Moore-paradoxical sentence ‘p and I do not believe p’, and so is irrational. To accept p while suspending judgment about ‘I believe p’ is irrational for similar reasons. So rationality requires that if you accept p and consider ‘I believe p’, you accept ‘I believe p’. (shrink)

Any system of taxation depends on a substantial degree of compliance from the taxpayer. But do ethical considerations stop at obeying the letter of the tax law, or do they drive one to take a more critical and socially responsible attitude towards tax avoidance as well as evasion? Dr Alan Stainer is Head of Engineering Management at Middlesex University, Bounds Green Road, London N11 2NQ, and Founder Director of the International Society for Productivity & Quality Research; Lorice Stainer is (...) Senior Lecturer in Business Ethics at the University of Hertfordshire Business School and a Business Ethics Consultant; and Alexandra Segal is a Chartered Accountant, Taxation Manager with Keelings Chartered Accountants, London, and a Taxation Consultant. (shrink)

"The book as a whole seeks to reinvigorate an academic discipline (philosophy of religion) which has fallen on hard times, and to do so by building a bridge between philosophy and empirical-historical studies of religion. The topic is both significant and timely. Too long the empiricists have been inadequately sophisticated philosophically and too long the philosophers have ignored historical data both in its breadth and depth. In not only calling for bridges between these disciplines, but actually building some, the work (...) makes a significant contribution to both." -- Alan Miller "This book is useful because it provides some insights both into the ways scholars think about various aspects of religious behavior, and also information about important features of such behavior. Both myth and philosophy are topics of great significance, and have been discussed by many philosophers and historians of religions and some anthropologists. An interesting set of questions about the nature of religion, and nature of philosophy and their relationships (and also about the nature of myth and its relationship to philosophy) is emerging at the forefront of academic discussions in departments of religion, departments of philosophy, and departments of anthropology. It contains some well-written and conceptually interesting essays." -- E. Thomas Lawson. (shrink)

Logical Empiricism is commonly regarded as uninterested in, if not hostile to sociological investigations of science. This paper reconstructs the views of Otto Neurath and Philipp Frank on the legitimacy and relevance of sociological investigations of theory choice. It is argued that while there obtains a surprising degree of convergence between their programmatic pronouncements and the Strong Programme, the two types of project nevertheless remain distinct. The key to this difference lies in the different assessment of a supposed dilemma (...) facing post-Mertonian sociologists of science. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:700 jOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 33:4 OCTOBER t995 131--35). As we should expect, Dummett's treatment of these and related matters is masterful. Chapters on Husserl and Frege on perception, and on something Dummett calls "Proto-Thoughts," exercise Dummett's peculiar gifts on new ground. The closing chapters bring us round to more familiar Dummettian themes: Since we must conceive of meaning as inextricably a feature of language, the fundamental (...) task will be to describe the character of a theory of meaning for a language. Davidson's work in this direction is subjected to new and interesting criticisms, but for those who see holism as central to the Quine/Davidson outlook, some (but not all) of these criticisms may seem misplaced. Dummett declares that if what someone means is determined by the theory of meaning which implicitly informs their utterances, then "we need to be told by what means I can recognize the other speaker as having the same theory of meaning as I do," and charges Davidson with a commitment to privacy (147ff.). But if"Davidson's holism be emphasized, there is no corroboration of a theory of meaning except rather vaguely in terms of how well it facilitates communication. It is this latter notion which wears the pants ontologically; hence meaning can only misleadingly be said to be a possession of individual speakers, something which a theory of meaning literally describes. A similar objection can be brought against the discussion of Wittgenstein which closes the book: Dummett asserts that Wittgenstein's admonition to chart statement-types rather than try to peer directly at the phenomenon "rests upon a quite definite conception of what meaning consists in" (t64); it is arguable that for Wittgenstein there is no univocally characterizable phenomenon called 'meaning' which that method is meant to capture-no single picture to substitute for the Frege-Russell picture. But on the whole this tightly conceived book is immensely stimulating, and it breaks new ground. As usual, Frege scholars will find much to argue with, direct reference theorists will be provoked, and no one whose ideas are said to be "celebrated" will imagine they are being complimented. Appended to the book is an interview in which Dummett describes the evolution of his philosophical interests. GARY KEMP University of Waikato Alan M. Olson, editor. Heidegger and Jaspers. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994. Pp. viii + 177. Cloth, $44.95. Paper, $19.95. Richard Wisser and Leonard H. Ehrlich, editors. Karl Jaspers: Philosopher among Philosophers/Philosoph unter Philosophen. Wiirzburg: K6nigshausen & Neumann, 1993. Pp. vii + 37o. Paper, $44.oo. Though one of the most pivotal philosophers of the twentieth century, Karl Jaspers is known primarily for the influence he had on other intellectuals of that period, especially Heidegger, as well for challenging his contemporaries to develop a sense of social responsibility in the post-war world. The collection of essays which Alan Olson has assembled not only underscores the originality of Jaspers's thought, but also shows the political context within which Jaspers criticized Heidegger for refusing to recant his BOOK REVIEWS 7Ol allegiance to National Socialism. In this regard, the reader cannot help but notice that there is a political thematic if not an agenda to the organization of the essays. Papers devoted to "Heidegger's Philosophy of Being from the Perspective of His Rectorate" (Leonard Ehrlich), "Shame, Guilt, Responsibility" (Karsten Harries), "The Psychological Dimension in Jaspers's Relationship with Heidegger" (Harold Oliver), "On the Responsibility of Intellectuals" (Joseph Margolis), and "Philosophy and Politics" (Tom Rockmore) serve as much to reveal the inadequacy of Heidegger's political vision as to demonstrate the viability of Jaspers's alternative of combining a post-Enlightenment rationality with an existential philosophy of limits. But despite certain polemical overtones, the volume as a whole is tightly organized, and most of the articles (including the others which I will briefly mention) are of remarkably high quality and thoughtprovoking in their own right. The editor selects a previously unpublished 1954 lecture of Paul Tillich's, "Heidegger and Jaspers," as the inaugural essay in the volume. Tillich points to the uneasy balance between the "existentialist" thrust of Heidegger's early philosophy, and the more "mystical" posture... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:700 jOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 33:4 OCTOBER t995 131--35). As we should expect, Dummett's treatment of these and related matters is masterful. Chapters on Husserl and Frege on perception, and on something Dummett calls "Proto-Thoughts," exercise Dummett's peculiar gifts on new ground. The closing chapters bring us round to more familiar Dummettian themes: Since we must conceive of meaning as inextricably a feature of language, the fundamental (...) task will be to describe the character of a theory of meaning for a language. Davidson's work in this direction is subjected to new and interesting criticisms, but for those who see holism as central to the Quine/Davidson outlook, some (but not all) of these criticisms may seem misplaced. Dummett declares that if what someone means is determined by the theory of meaning which implicitly informs their utterances, then "we need to be told by what means I can recognize the other speaker as having the same theory of meaning as I do," and charges Davidson with a commitment to privacy (147ff.). But if"Davidson's holism be emphasized, there is no corroboration of a theory of meaning except rather vaguely in terms of how well it facilitates communication. It is this latter notion which wears the pants ontologically; hence meaning can only misleadingly be said to be a possession of individual speakers, something which a theory of meaning literally describes. A similar objection can be brought against the discussion of Wittgenstein which closes the book: Dummett asserts that Wittgenstein's admonition to chart statement-types rather than try to peer directly at the phenomenon "rests upon a quite definite conception of what meaning consists in" (t64); it is arguable that for Wittgenstein there is no univocally characterizable phenomenon called 'meaning' which that method is meant to capture-no single picture to substitute for the Frege-Russell picture. But on the whole this tightly conceived book is immensely stimulating, and it breaks new ground. As usual, Frege scholars will find much to argue with, direct reference theorists will be provoked, and no one whose ideas are said to be "celebrated" will imagine they are being complimented. Appended to the book is an interview in which Dummett describes the evolution of his philosophical interests. GARY KEMP University of Waikato Alan M. Olson, editor. Heidegger and Jaspers. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994. Pp. viii + 177. Cloth, $44.95. Paper, $19.95. Richard Wisser and Leonard H. Ehrlich, editors. Karl Jaspers: Philosopher among Philosophers/Philosoph unter Philosophen. Wiirzburg: K6nigshausen & Neumann, 1993. Pp. vii + 37o. Paper, $44.oo. Though one of the most pivotal philosophers of the twentieth century, Karl Jaspers is known primarily for the influence he had on other intellectuals of that period, especially Heidegger, as well for challenging his contemporaries to develop a sense of social responsibility in the post-war world. The collection of essays which Alan Olson has assembled not only underscores the originality of Jaspers's thought, but also shows the political context within which Jaspers criticized Heidegger for refusing to recant his BOOK REVIEWS 7Ol allegiance to National Socialism. In this regard, the reader cannot help but notice that there is a political thematic if not an agenda to the organization of the essays. Papers devoted to "Heidegger's Philosophy of Being from the Perspective of His Rectorate" (Leonard Ehrlich), "Shame, Guilt, Responsibility" (Karsten Harries), "The Psychological Dimension in Jaspers's Relationship with Heidegger" (Harold Oliver), "On the Responsibility of Intellectuals" (Joseph Margolis), and "Philosophy and Politics" (Tom Rockmore) serve as much to reveal the inadequacy of Heidegger's political vision as to demonstrate the viability of Jaspers's alternative of combining a post-Enlightenment rationality with an existential philosophy of limits. But despite certain polemical overtones, the volume as a whole is tightly organized, and most of the articles (including the others which I will briefly mention) are of remarkably high quality and thoughtprovoking in their own right. The editor selects a previously unpublished 1954 lecture of Paul Tillich's, "Heidegger and Jaspers," as the inaugural essay in the volume. Tillich points to the uneasy balance between the "existentialist" thrust of Heidegger's early philosophy, and the more "mystical" posture... (shrink)

First, this collection seeks to examine exactly what Levinass writings mean for both Jews and Christians. Second, it takes a snapshot of the current state of Jewish-Christian dialogue, using Levinas as the rationale for the discussion. Three generations of Levinas scholars are represented. Contributors: Leora Batnitzky, Jeffrey Bloechl, Richard A. Cohen, Paul Franks, Robert Gibbs, Kevin Hart, Dana Hollander, Robyn Horner, Jeffrey L. Kosky, Jean-Luc Marion, Michael Purcell, Michael A. Signer, Merold Westphal, Elliott R. Wolfson, Edith Wyschogrod.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:270 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY The Prophets of Paris. By Frank E. Manuel. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962.) This perceptive and sophisticated contribution to the history of ideas is organized around the intellectual biographies of Turgot, Condorcet, Saint-Simon, the Saint-Simoniarts, Charles Fourier, and Auguste Comte. Professor Manuel's prophets were all Frenchmen and all, he believes, can be placed in a common tradition marked by their conviction that Paris was (...) the mount from which the new gospel had to be delivered, that love was the key to social organization, and that social and religious relationships were more significant than political forms. He presents them as prophets in the Old Testament sense--as unsparing moral critics, teachers and the "revealers of a divine historical design." They were philosophers of an age of crisis, convinced that theirs was the instant of a great human divide and therefore victims "of the anguish of futurity." The future they so confidently foretold to anyone who cared to listen, and to many who did not, has found many of their prophetic visions to be poor predictions, but for Manuel they cannot be dismissed as utopian cranks or frustrated totalitarians. Many of the issues they raised and problems they sensed have yet to be adequately confronted, and it is this prescience, particularly with regard to the psychological conditions of social existence, that Manuel wishes to emphasize. This treatment, as its author admits, is a "frank attempt at rehabilitation, to right the balance of historical judgement and bestow new worth upon thinkers who have often been treated with superficiality" (pp. 1-10). Manuel's approach to the history of ideas lends itself quite effectively to this purpose. He admits to a "romantic view of history-writing" which entails an effort to establish an intimacy with his subjects through an immersion in their manuscripts, in the "scribbled brouillons, the casual notes, the personal letters," as well as in the identity presented through their published works. His writing of history is romantic not only in this regard but much more profoundly in his historicism, which attempts an immediate empathetic confrontation with the total organic complex of his subject's life, ideas, and environment. Manuel's evident sympathy occasionally tempts him into apologetics, but essentially he is not arguing a brief for the defense but trying to understand what it was that made these men see so far, and yet with such myopic arrogance, and what it was they saw. It seemed to me that his approach is most successful with Fourier, and least so with Turgot. Charles Fourier, the self-taught travelling salesman from Besan~on, is often summarily dismissed as a cosmic crank with easy reference to his fantastic aberrations --his seas of lemonade and the copulation of the planets. Manuel helps us to understand not only the aberrations but the prescient insights by establishing the relationship between Fourier's personality and his ideas, as well as by tracing the connections between apparently contradictory conceptions. He does not misuse this technique of intellectual biography by patronizing or justifying a system of thought with reference to its psychological antecedents, but rather helps to illuminate a philosophy by examining the reasons for its expression. This works particularly well with Fourier, an obsessed and deprived personality, whose great contribution, according to Manuel, was the assimilation into a social doctrine of the fundamental needs and drives of mankind--its "manifold wants, its secret desires, and its obstinate fixations" (p. 203). Both Fourier and the SaintSimonians believe that it was pointless to tinker with the social environment without regard for permanent psychological realities, but the latter hoped to sublimate human passions through a social organization that redefined them, while Fourier wanted a social system that would provide for their total gratification (p. 226). Occasionally Manuel rather triumphantly unearths striking parallels with our present BOOK REVIEWS 271 concerns that do not demonstrate the vision of his seers into the future so much as his discovery of analogues in the past. Fourier's case is not particularly strengthened by the observation that his vision of a climate so benign under the regime of phalansteries as to render tire very poles inhabitable is "no longer as... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Books ReceivedThe Act of Being: The Philosophy of Revelation in Mullā Sadrā. By Christian Jambet. Brooklyn: Zone Books, 2006. Pp. 497. Hardcover $38.95.Analysis in Śaṅkara Vedānta: The Philosophy of Ganeswar Misra. Edited by Bijayananda Kar. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 2006. Pp. xxv + 190. Hardcover Rs. 240.00.Bhakti and Philosophy. By R. Raj Singh. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2006. Pp. 112. Hardcover $65.00.Brahman and the Ethos of Organization. (...) By Leonard R. Silos. Paseo de Roxas: Asian Institute of Management, 2006. Pp. xix + 344. Price not given.Buddhist Inclusivism: Attitudes Towards Religious Others. By Kristin Beise Kiblinger. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2005. Pp. viii + 145. Hardcover $89.95.Classical Northern Wu Style Tai Ji Quan: The Fighting Art of the Manchurian Palace Guard. By Tina Chunna Zhang and Frank Allen. Berkeley: Blue Snake Books, 2006. Pp. xiii + 203. Paper $21.95.Classical Sāṃkhya and Yoga: An Indian Metaphysics of Experience. By Mikel Burley. London and New York: Routledge, 2007. Pp. xiv + 226. Price not given.Comparative Philosophy and Religion in Times of Terror. Edited by Douglas Allen. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2006. Pp. xiv + 257. Hardcover $62.00. Paper $32.00.Contemplative Science: Where Buddhism and Neuroscience Converge. By B. Alan Wallace. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007. Pp. vii + 211. Hardcover $29.50, £19.00.Contexts and Dialogue: Yogācāra Buddhism and Modern Psychology on the Subliminal Mind. By Tao Jiang. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2006. Pp. xi + 198. Paper $20.00.Dialogue Transcultural. Edited by Yue Diayun et al. Nanjing: Jiangsu Peoples Press, 2006. Pp. 335. Price not given.Dōgen on Meditation and Thinking: A Reflection on His View of Zen. By Hee-Jin Kim. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006. Pp. xiii + 169. Hardcover $65.50. Paper $21.95.The Garden of Loneliness: A Translation of Jayshankar Prasad's Āṅsū, "Tears." By Charles S. J. White. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2006. Pp. xv + 136. Hardcover Rs. 295. [End Page 608]The Happening of Tradition: Vallabha on Anumāna in Nyāyalīlāvatī. By Anna-Pya Sjödin. Stockholm: Elanders Gotab, 2006. Pp. 195. Price not given.Head, Eyes, Flesh, and Blood: Giving Away the Body in Indian Buddhist Literature. By Reiko Ohnuma. 2006. Pp. xvii + 372. Hardcover $45.00, £29.00.Hwa Yu T'ai Chi Ch'uan: Unlocking the Mysteries of the Five-Word Song. By Glenn D. Newth. Berkeley: Blue Snake Books, 2007. Pp. xiii + 160. U.S. $18.95. Can $24.95.A Jewish Philosopher of Baghdad: 'Izz al-Dawla Ibn Kammūna (d. 683/1284) and His Writings. By Reza Pourjavady and Sabine Schmidtke. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2006. Pp. xii + 274. Hardcover $130.00, €100.Letting Be: Fred Dallmayr's Cosmopolitical Vision. Edited by Stephen F. Schneck. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006. Pp. x + 382. Paper $35.00.Myth and the Existential Quest. By Vassilis Vitsaxis and translated by Deborah Brown Kazazis and Vassilis Vitsaxis. Boston: Somerset Hall Press, 2006. Pp. 301. Hardcover $49.95. Paper $39.95.Nietzsche-Buddha-Zarathustra: Eine West-Ost Konfiguration. By Michael Skowron. Daegu: Kyungpook National University Press, 2006. Pp. 293. Paper $18.00, Won 17,000.Popularizing Buddhism: Preaching as Performance in Sri Lanka. By Mahinda Deegalle. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006. Pp. xiii + 241. Hardcover $65.00. Paper $21.95.Ramana Maharashi: The Sage of Arunachala. By Arvind Sharma. New Delhi: Penquin Group, 2006. Pp. 215. Hardcover Rs. 295.Readings in Han Chinese Thought. Edited and translated by Mark Csikszentmihalyi. Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 2006. Pp. xxx + 220. Hardcover $39.95. Paper $14.95.Religions of Korea in Practice. Edited by Robert E. Buswell Jr. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007. Pp. xx + 542. Paper $24.95, £15.95.The Scripture on Great Peace: The Taiping jing and the Beginnings of Daoism. By Barbara Hendrischke. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006. Pp. x + 410. Hardcover $60.00, £38.95.The Self 's Awareness of Itself: Bhaṭṭa Rāmakantha's Arguments against the Buddhist Doctrine of No-Self. By Alex Watson. Vienna: Sammlung de Nobili, 2006. Pp. 433. Price not given... (shrink)

Famously, Frank P. Ramsey suggested a test for the acceptability of conditionals. Recently, David Chalmers and Alan Hájek (2007) have criticized a qualitative variant of the Ramsey test for indicative conditionals. In this paper we argue for the following three claims: (i) Chalmers and Hájek are right that the variant of the Ramsey test that they attack is not the correct way of spelling out an acceptability test for indicative conditionals. But there is a suppositional variant of the (...) Ramsey test which is still stated in purely qualitative terms, which avoids the problems, and which looks correct. (ii) While the variant of the Ramsey test that Chalmers and Hájek criticize is not correct, it is still a good approximation of a correct formulation of the Ramsey test which may be usefully employed in various contexts. (iii) The variant of the Ramsey test that Chalmers and Hájek suggest as a substitute for the deficient version of the Ramsey test is itself subject to worries similar to those raised by Chalmers and Hájek, if it is given a non-suppositional interpretation. (shrink)